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        n January 22, 2021, the Standing Committee of the 13th National Peo-
ple’s Congress adopted the Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (MPL), which took effect on February 1, 2021.1 The MPL purports to 
regulate the duties of China’s maritime police agencies, led by the China 
Coast Guard, and safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, rights, and inter-
ests. It applies in sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC).2 Specifically, under the MPL, the maritime police agencies will 
carry out maritime safety and security, maintain maritime security and order, 
combat maritime smuggling, supervise the development and utilization of 
marine resources, protect the marine ecological environment, and conduct 
marine fishery production operations.3 The MPL, therefore, has potentially 
far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its 
mainland and Hainan Island,4 as well as sovereignty over the South China 
Sea (SCS) islands and adjacent waters, and sovereign rights and jurisdiction 
over the relevant waters, seabed, and subsoil encompassed by the nine-dash 
line.5  
This expansive application of law enforcement jurisdiction is problem-
atic given that most (if not all) of China’s maritime claims are inconsistent 
with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).6 
China’s straight baselines along its mainland coast and around the Paracel 
 
1. Maritime Police Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 84 (promulgated by 
Standing Committee, 13th Nat’l People’s Cong., Jan. 22, 2021, effective Feb. 1, 2021) 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 22, 2021, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0123/           
c1001-32009344.html [hereinafter MPL]. 
2. Id. arts. 1, 3, 10. 
3. Id. art. 5. 
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE FOR OCEAN POLICY AFFAIRS, 
MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code         
_10_mcrm.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).  
5. Note Verbal, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United 
Nations, Notification Regarding the Joint Submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Com-
mission on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Concerning the Outer Limits of the 
Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, Ref. No. CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009), 
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009                                                        
re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.   
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. See Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, China’s Legacy Maritime Claims, LAW-












Islands are not in conformity with UNCLOS.7 These excessive baselines al-
low China to illegally extend its various maritime zones. China also imper-
missibly claims the right to require prior permission for warships to transit 
its territorial sea in innocent passage, authority to regulate non-resource-re-
lated military activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), exercise secu-
rity jurisdiction in its contiguous zone (reiterated in Article 28 of the MPL), 
and establish an unlawful air defense identification zone in the East China 
Sea (ECS).8 Of note, an international arbitral tribunal has unanimously ruled 
that China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the SCS maritime 
areas encompassed by the nine-dash line are contrary to UNCLOS and with-
out legal effect.9 Therefore, to the extent that the MPL purports to assert 
PRC jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels in these areas, it contravenes 





Article 12 sets out specific duties for the coastal police agencies (CCG). De-
pending on where these authorities are executed, they could violate interna-
tional law. The CCG is tasked, inter alia, with “guarding key islands and reefs, 
managing and protecting maritime boundaries, and preventing, stopping and 
eliminating acts that endanger national sovereignty, security and maritime 
rights and interests.”10 While safeguarding undisputed territory and maritime 
boundaries may be permissible, using force to execute these tasks in con-
tested areas like the ECS and SCS could violate Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter.11  
 
7. See BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIEN-
TIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEA NO. 117: STRAIGHT BASE-
LINE CLAIMS: CHINA (1996), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/LIS-
117.pdf.   
8. See Pedrozo, supra note 6. 
9. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013–19, PCA Case Repos-
itory, Award, ¶¶ 169–278, 631, 682, 1203B(2) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pca-
cpa.org/en/cases/7/  [hereinafter SCS Award]; Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Secretary of State, 
Press Statement, U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea (July 13, 2020), 
https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/in-
dex.html [hereinafter U.S. SCS Position]. 
10. MPL, supra note 1, art. 12. 












Similarly, protecting “important maritime targets and major activities” is 
of concern.12 If this provision is intended to authorize the use of the CCG 
to protect survey vessels (e.g., Haiyang Dizhi 8) or oil rigs (e.g., Hai Yang Shi 
You 981) engaged in hydrocarbon exploration in foreign EEZs and conti-
nental shelves,13 or protect Chinese fishing vessels engaged in illegal, unre-
ported, and unregulated fishing in the SCS,14 such activities would interfere 
with the sovereign resource rights of other nations and would directly violate 
UNCLOS.15 Coastal States enjoy exclusive sovereign rights, to the exclusion 
of all other States, over the living and non-living resources in their EEZ and 
continental shelf.16  
Chapter III (Maritime Security) of the MPL also contains several articles 
that potentially violate fundamental principles of international law. For ex-
ample, foreign ships that “illegally enter” China’s territorial sea may be or-
dered to “leave immediately.”17 Article 17 also authorizes the CCG to take 
enforcement measures in the territorial sea, “such as detention, forced re-
moval, and forced towing.”18 Without defining the meaning of illegal entry, 
the law could be used as a subterfuge to hamper the right of innocent pas-
sage, which is guaranteed to all ships of all States and cannot be impaired or 
denied by China except in accordance with UNCLOS.19  
Article 20 authorizes the CCG to use force to stop foreign entities from 
constructing buildings or structures and installing fixed or floating devices,  
to include the demolition of these facilities, in waters under PRC jurisdic-
tion.20 All of the SCS claimants except Brunei have established outposts on 
several features also claimed by China.21 Article 20 appears to authorize the 
destruction of these facilities, which would constitute an illegal use of force 
 
12. MPL, supra note 1, art. 12. 
13. Huong Le Thu, China’s Incursion into Vietnam’s EEZ and Lessons from the Past, ASIA 
MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Aug. 8, 2019), https://amti.csis.org/chinas-incur-
sion-into-vietnams-eez-and-lessons-from-the-past/.  
14. Jose Katigbak, Chinese Coast Guard Regularly Intimidate Filipino Fishermen, PHILSTAR 
GLOBAL (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2019/03/29/1905562/chi-
nese-coast-guard-regularly-intimidate-filipino-fishermen.  
15. SCS Award, supra note 9, ¶¶ 649–814; U.S. SCS Position, supra note 9. 
16. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 56. 
17. MPL, supra note 1, art. 17. 
18. Id. art. 17. 
19. UNCLOS, supra note 6, arts. 17, 24. 
20. MPL, supra note 1, art. 20. 
21. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ASIA-PACIFIC: MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY 













inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and a clear violation 
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. It also could have unintended consequences, 
particularly in the ECS and SCS, if China uses the law to justify increased 
deployments of CCG ships to the Senkakus and Spratlys to defend Chinese 
sovereignty claims and protect Chinese fishermen.22 
The United States has repeatedly stated that the Senkakus, as a territory 
administered by Japan, are covered by Article V of the U.S.-Japan mutual 
defense treaty.23 A Chinese attack on the Senkakus, to include actions by the 
CCG, would trigger U.S. defense obligations under the treaty.24 An attack by 
the CCG on Philippine military forces in the SCS at Second Thomas Shoal 
or Scarborough Shoal would likewise invoke U.S. defense obligations under 
Articles IV and V of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).25 
Philippine marines maintain an outpost on the BRP Sierra Madre, a Phil-
ippine Navy warship intentionally grounded on Second Thomas Shoal in 
1999. The presence of these marines has, in effect, been validated by the 
arbitral tribunal award, which concluded that the Shoal is a low-tide elevation 
that is part of the Philippine EEZ and continental shelf and therefore not 
subject to appropriation by China.26 On occasion, the CCG and Chinese 
Navy have attempted to interfere with the resupply of the marines but have 
not yet tried to expel them from the Shoal.27 The MPL could prompt a CCG 
attack on the marines, which would clearly invoke U.S. defense obligations. 
Although the United States does not take a position regarding the Philippines 
 
22. Aakriti Sharma, Japan Could Face the Brunt of Chinese Navy as Beijing Drafts Another 
Powerful Law Over Contested Waters, EURASIAN TIMES (Nov. 6, 2020), https://eura-
siantimes.com/japan-could-face-the-brunt-of-chinese-navy-as-beijing-drafts-another-pow-
erful-law-over-contested-waters/.  
23. Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://kr.usembassy.gov/021017-joint-statement-president-donald-j-
trump-prime-minister-shinzo-abe/.  
24. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America 
and Japan art. V, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 3547, 273 U.N.T.S. 
223. 
25. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philip-
pines arts. IV–V, Phil.-U.S., Aug. 30, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 4644, T.I.A.S. No. 2617, 179 U.N.T.S. 
133 [hereinafter U.S.-RP MDT]. 
26. SCS Award, supra note 9, ¶¶ 309, 381, 383, 627. 
27. Raul Pedrozo, Stop China’s Unlawful “Great Wall” in the South China Sea, NATIONAL 













territorial claims in the SCS, the MDT applies if there is an armed attack on 
the armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft of either party in the Pacific.28  
The CCG could also rely on the MPL to justify increased interference 
with U.S. ships engaged in freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), 
military surveys, and presence operations in the SCS. China has repeatedly 
protested U.S. FONOPS in the Spratlys and Paracels as an infringement of 
Chinese sovereignty. Article 21 illegally authorizes the CCG to use force, 
including “forced eviction and forced towing,”29 against foreign warships 
and other sovereign immune vessels that refuse to leave waters under PRC 
jurisdiction for purported violations of China’s laws and regulations.  Except 
in situations where a foreign warship has demonstrated hostile intent or 
committed a hostile act, the sole remedy for noncompliance with coastal 
State laws and regulations in the territorial sea is an order to leave the terri-
torial sea and a diplomatic protest.30 Seaward of the territorial sea, foreign 
warships and other sovereign immune vessels have complete immunity from 
the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.31 A threat or use of 
force by the CCG against a U.S. warship would certainly generate a response 
in self-defense by the warship consistent with the U.S. Standing Rules of 
Engagement.32 
Finally, Article 22 allows the CCG to use all necessary measures, includ-
ing the use of weapons to stop, inter alia, infringement of its sovereignty, 
sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.33 As previously discussed, the use of force 
against sovereign immune vessels is inconsistent with international law. Sim-
ilarly, the use of force against other ships must conform to existing State 
practice on the use of force by maritime law enforcement authorities, as dis-
cussed below. 
Article 25 is highly problematic from a freedom of navigation perspec-
tive in that it authorizes the establishment of temporary maritime security 
zones restricting or prohibiting the passage or stay of ships in waters subject 
to PRC jurisdiction. These zones may be established for any of the following 
reasons: (1) to perform maritime security tasks; (2) to combat illegal and 
criminal activities at sea; (3) to deal with emergencies at sea; (4) to protect 
 
28. U.S.-RP MDT, supra note 25, art. V. 
29. MPL, supra note 1, art. 21. 
30. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 30. 
31. Id. arts. 58, 86, 95–96. 
32. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement 
(SROE)/Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) for U.S. Forces (2005). 












marine resources and the ecological environment; or (5) any other situation 
that requires the delimitation of temporary maritime security zones.34   
UNCLOS allows a coastal State to temporarily suspend innocent passage 
in a specified area of its territorial sea “if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security, including weapons exercises.”35 Thus, establishing 
a temporary maritime security zone in the territorial sea for a brief period to 
perform maritime security tasks or combat illegal and criminal activities at 
sea may be permissible under UNCLOS. However, beyond the territorial 
sea, all ships enjoy high seas freedom of navigation and no State may validly 
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.36 Accordingly, China may 
not establish maritime security zones beyond its territorial sea for any of the 
enumerated reasons.  
Similarly, coastal State authority beyond the territorial sea to protect ma-
rine resources and the marine environment is limited. Article 211 of UN-
CLOS allows coastal States to adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction, and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels in the terri-
torial sea, but these laws and regulations may not hamper innocent passage.37 
Thus, even in the territorial sea, the passage of foreign ships may not be 
impeded. In the EEZ, coastal State authority is limited to controlling vessel-
source pollution by giving effect to International Maritime Organization-ap-
proved international rules and standards, which do not include the designa-
tion of maritime security zones or denial of passage.38 Finally, coastal States 
may, consistent with UNCLOS Articles 60 and 80, establish reasonable 
safety zones up to five hundred meters around artificial islands, installations, 
and structures in the EEZ and on the continental shelf to ensure the safety 
of navigation and that of the installations and structures.39 
 
III. MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF FORCE 
 
It is not uncommon or unlawful for a coast guard to use force in the execu-
tion of its mission to the extent the force used is reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), for example, is 
tasked with making inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, 
 
34. Id. art. 25. 
35. UNCLOS, supra note 6, art. 25. 
36. Id. arts. 58, 86–87, 89. 
37. Id. art. 211. 
38. Id. 












and arrests upon the high seas and in waters over which the United States 
has jurisdiction for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations 
of U.S. laws. In the execution of these duties, USCG personnel may board 
any vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction; address inquiries to those on board; 
examine the ship’s documents and papers; examine, inspect, and search the 
vessel; and use all necessary force to compel compliance.  
USCG personnel may also arrest persons on board and seize the vessel 
if they determine that U.S. laws have been violated.40 However, USCG per-
sonnel may only use the force that is objectively reasonable considering the 
facts and circumstances confronting them at the time force is applied. In this 
regard, reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Accordingly, there is a 
range of responses that may be reasonable and appropriate under a particular 
set of circumstances. Once physical force is used, it will be discontinued 
when resistance ceases or when the incident is under control.41  
Although not specifically applicable to maritime law enforcement oper-
ations, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Personnel similarly 
provides that law enforcement officials “may use force only when strictly 
necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.”42 In 
other words, the use of force is the exception—not the rule—and any use 
of force must be “reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the pre-
vention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest” of a sus-
pected offender.43 Additionally, under UN rules, if the use of force or fire-
arms is unavoidable, it shall be proportionate to the “seriousness of the of-
fense and legitimate objective to be achieved,” and “minimize damage and 
injury, and respect and preserve human life.”44  
 
40. 14 U.S.C. § 89. 
41. Memorandum from Acting Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and Under 
Secretary for Management to Component Heads, Policy Statement 044-05, Department 
Policy on the Use of Force (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/pub-
lications/mgmt/law-enforcement/mgmt-dir_044-05-department-policy-on-the-use-of-
force.pdf [hereinafter DHS Policy Statement 044-05]. 
42. G.A. Res.  34/169, Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials art. 3 (Dec. 
17, 1979) [hereinafter UN Code of Conduct]. 
43. Id. art. 3 cmt. 
44. Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 112 (Aug. 27 – Sept. 7, 1990) [hereinafter UN Basic Principles 












Maritime law enforcement (MLE) personnel are expected to use tactics 
and techniques that effectively bring an incident under control, ensures their 
safety, and minimizes the risk of unintended injury or serious property dam-
age. There is no requirement, however, that MLE personnel meet force with 
equal or lesser force. Nor do MLE personnel have a duty to retreat to avoid 
the reasonable use of force or wait for an attack before using reasonable 
force to stop a threat. Moreover, in exigent situations, for individual self-
defense or defense of another, MLE personnel are authorized to use any 
available object or technique in a manner that is reasonable considering the 
circumstances. Nonetheless, MLE personnel should avoid intentionally and 
unreasonably placing themselves in a position in which they have no alter-
native but to use deadly force.45  
Under the U.S. rules, if feasible, prior to using force, MLE personnel 
should identify themselves and issue a verbal warning to comply with their 
instructions. In determining whether a warning is feasible under the circum-
stances, MLE personnel should consider, inter alia, whether the resulting de-
lay in issuing a warning is likely to (1) increase the danger to themselves or 
others, including any victims and/or bystanders, (2) result in the destruction 
of evidence, (3) allow a subject to escape, or (4) result in the commission of 
a crime. If a warning is issued, MLE personnel should afford the subject a 
reasonable opportunity to voluntarily comply before using force.46 
The UN Principles on Use of Force contain a similar requirement. Law 
enforcement officials “shall identify themselves . . . and give a clear warning 
of their intent to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be 
observed,” unless doing so would “unduly place the law enforcement offi-
cials at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other persons 
or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances of the 
incident.”47  
When conducting maritime law enforcement operations, USCG person-
nel may use warning shots only as a signal to a vessel to stop, and only after 
all other available means of signaling have failed. USCG personnel may also 
discharge firearms to disable moving vessels or other maritime convey-
ances.48 However, before firing at or into a vessel, USCG personnel will first 
fire a gun as a warning signal unless they determine that firing a warning 
signal will unreasonably endanger persons or property in the vicinity of the 
 
45. DHS Policy Statement 044-05, supra note 41. 
46. Id. 
47. UN Basic Principles on Use of Force, supra note 44. 












vessel to be stopped.49 Warning shots and disabling fire are not intended to 
cause bodily injury. Accordingly, since warning shots and disabling fire are 
inherently dangerous, they should be used with all due care and with safety 
as the primary consideration. Additionally, if warning shots or disabling fire 
is warranted, each shot must have a defined target.50  
MLE personnel may use deadly force only when they have a reasonable 
belief that the subject of such force poses an imminent threat of death or 
serious bodily injury to them or another person. Deadly force may not be 
used solely to prevent the escape of a fleeing subject unless MLE personnel 
have a reasonable belief that the subject poses a significant threat of death 
or serious physical harm to them or others, and such force is necessary to 
prevent escape. Discharging a firearm against a person constitutes the use of 
deadly force. It is to be done only with the intent of preventing or stopping 
the threatening behavior that justifies the use of deadly force. Under the U.S. 
rules, firearms are not to be discharged solely as a warning or signal or solely 
to disable moving vessels unless constituting a warning shot or disabling 
fire.51  
Similarly, the use of firearms under the UN Code of Conduct is an ex-
treme measure, and “every effort should be made to exclude the use of fire-
arms.”52 It provides that law enforcement officials shall, as far as possible, 
“apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms,” 
and “may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or 
without any promise of achieving the intended result.”53 As a general rule, 
law enforcement officials should not use firearms unless “a suspected of-
fender offers armed resistance or otherwise jeopardizes the lives of others 
and less extreme measures are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the 
suspected offender.”54  
Accordingly, while the CCG may use force to execute its mission, it can-
not be indiscriminate; any force used must be reasonable and necessary un-
der the circumstances. The use of force against a foreign-flagged vessel that 
intrudes into Chinese-claimed territorial waters or threatens Chinese territo-
rial claims or fails to heed an order or a warning may not be reasonable and 
necessary under a totality of the circumstances.  
 
49. 14 U.S.C. § 526. 
50. DHS Policy Statement 044-05, supra note 41. 
51. Id. 
52. U.N. Code of Conduct, supra note 42, art. 3 cmt. 
53. U.N. Basic Principles on Use of Force, supra note 44. 












Indiscriminate use of force would violate international law. In the 1929 
I’m Alone case, an arbitration commission found that a USCG cutter crew’s 
decision to intentionally sink a vessel was not justified under international 
law.55 In that case, the USCG pursued the vessel for two days for suspected 
smuggling of liquor. The USCG personnel then sank the vessel after the 
captain refused multiple orders and signals, including the use of warning 
shots and disabling fire, to heave to for boarding.  
Similarly, in Red Crusader (1961), a commission of enquiry found that a 
Danish frigate had exceeded the legitimate use of force by firing solid, non-
explosive gunshots at the Red Crusader’s scanner, mast, masthead light, hull, 
and stern without warning, thereby creating a danger to those on board the 
vessel without proven necessity, even though the vessel was not sunk and 
no one was injured.56 The Red Crusader had been boarded for alleged illegal 
fishing but fled the scene with two Danish sailors on board and refused to 
heave to after the Danish frigate fired four warning shots, accompanied by 
sound signals to stop.  
Finally, in the M/V Saiga judgment, the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea found that the use of force by a Guinean patrol boat to stop 
and board the Saiga for an alleged violation of Guinean customs laws, both 
before and after the boarding, was excessive and unreasonable, and endan-
gered human life.57 The Tribunal determined that international law requires 
that the use of force must be avoided if possible and, if the use of force is 
unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the 
circumstances. When boarded on the high seas, the Saiga, a coastal tanker, 
was fully laden with gas oil and had recently provided fuel to fishing vessels 
in Guinea’s contiguous zone. The Guinean patrol boat opened fire on the 
tanker with live ammunition using solid shot from large-caliber automatic 
weapons without issuing any signal or warning, as required by international 
law and practice. The Tribunal also found that the boarding party’s use of 
weapons was excessive given that the tanker’s crew did not resist and did not 





55. S.S. “I’m Alone” (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609 (1935). 
56. Red Crusader (U.K. v. Den.), 29 I.L.R. 521 (Comm’n of Enquiry 1962). 















To be fair, not all of the MPL is legally objectionable. Chapter VI, which 
regulates the use of weapons by CCG personnel, could arguably be inter-
preted to comport with international maritime law enforcement standards. 
Article 47 authorizes the use of small arms weapons if there is evidence that 
a ship is carrying criminal suspects or illegally carrying weapons, ammunition, 
state secrets, or drugs and other items and refuses to obey an order to stop. 
Use of small arms is also authorized if a foreign ship enters waters under 
PRC jurisdiction and illegally engages in production activities, refuses to 
obey an order to stop, or refuses to accept boarding or inspection, and the 
use of other measures is not sufficient to stop the illegal act.58 Article 48 
authorizes the use of shipborne and airborne weapons, in addition to small 
arms, when the CCG is (1) performing maritime anti-terrorism missions, (2) 
dealing with serious incidents of violence at sea, or (3) attacked by weapons 
or other dangerous methods.59 A prior warning that the use of weapons is 
imminent is not required by Article 49 if giving a warning “may cause more 
serious harmful consequences.”60 Finally, Article 50 limits the use of weap-
ons to situations that are reasonably necessary and requires that CCG per-
sonnel try to avoid or reduce unnecessary casualties and property losses.61 
Thus, on its face, Chapter VI could be applied in a manner that is consistent 
with international maritime law enforcement standards regarding the use of 
weapons. 
However, China does not have a good track record when it comes to 
observing the rules-based international legal order when conducting mari-
time law enforcement activities.62 The CCG has repeatedly harassed63 and 
engaged in excessive use of force against Vietnamese,64 Japanese,65 and 
 
58. MPL, supra note 1, art. 47. 
59. Id. art. 48. 
60. Id. art. 49. 
61. Id. art. 50. 
62. Press Statement, Morgan Ortagus, U.S. Department of State Spokesperson, PRC’s 
Reported Sinking of a Vietnamese Fishing Vessel in the South China Sea (Apr. 6, 2020).   
63. U.S. SCS Position, supra note 9. 
64. Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, China Coast Guard Sinking of a Vi-
etnam Fishing Vessel (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Re-
lease/Article/2143925/china-coast-guard-sinking-of-a-vietnam-fishing-vessel/.  
65. Matthew M. Burke & Aya Ichihashi, Japan Coast Guard Protects Fishing Boat from Chi-













Filipino66 fishermen to advance China’s illegal claims in the ECS and SCS 
and unlawfully deny access to offshore resources in coastal State EEZs. 
Given the CCG’s prior malign behavior and disregard for international law, 
it is unlikely that the MPL will be implemented in accordance with estab-
lished maritime law enforcement practices. 
It would be a grave mistake for China to use the new law as a subterfuge 
to advance its illegal maritime and territorial claims in the ECS and SCS, to 
continue interfering with coastal State resource rights, or to interfere with 
legitimate uses of the sea by the international community. The United States 
will stand by its allies and partners in the region to protect their sovereign 
rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations un-
der international law, and will defend navigational rights and freedoms to 
ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. Regional States must also do their part 
and hold China accountable for its illegal actions, whether that is before an 
international tribunal or domestic court, through diplomatic overtures or use 





66. Steven Stashwick, Chinese Vessel Rams, Sinks Philippine Fishing Boat in Reed Bank, THE 
DIPLOMAT (June 14, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/chinese-vessel-rams-sinks-
philippine-fishing-boat-in-reed-bank/.  
